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RESPONSE

EXCLUDING RELIGION: A REPLY

NELSON TEBBE'

In response to Thomas C. Berg, Response, Religious Choice and Exclusions of Religion, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 100 (2008); Richard

W. Garnett, Response, "ExcludingReligion ": A Response, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 113 (2008); Steven D. Smith, Response, Playing

Around with Religion's Constitutional Joints, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 123 (2008).
Disputes concerning exclusions of religion have continued to flare
up during the last year. A school district in New Jersey was sued for
prohibiting devotional religious music in its holiday programs,' and
six Virginia State Police troopers resigned their voluntary positions as
chaplains after the state disallowed denominational prayers at the departinent's public events. 2 Sometimes, the results of these disputes
seemed to be in tension with one another, at least on the surface.
While a city was permitted to exclude sectarian legislative prayers,3 a
state was prohibited from limiting a scholarship program to colleges
that were not pervasively sectarian.' And while one local legislature

Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D.,
University of Chicago Divinity School. Thanks to Thomas Berg, Richard Garnett, and
Steven Smith for reading and responding with care. For helpful comments on previous versions of this Response, I thank Michael Cahill, Susan Herman, Richard Primus,
and Christopher Serkin.
1 Stratechik v. Bd. of Edtic., S. Orange-Maplewood Sch. Dist.,
577 F. Supp. 2d 731,
739, 741 (D.N.J. 2008) (describing and upholding the policy).
2 Anita Kurnar, Under Bav, Six Toopets Resign as Chaplains,
WASH. POST, Sept. 25,
2008, at B6.
Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 353 (4th Cir. 2008).
4 Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th
Cir. 2008).
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could restrict opening invocations to monotheistic religions, 5 another
was constitutionally barred from allowing only clergy from certain denominations to offer prayers.
Although the proper outcomes of
these disputes may be unclear, it is beyond doubt that the problem of
excluding religion continues to trouble constitutional decision makers.
Excluding religion is the practice of singling out religious actors
or entities for special denial of government aid or support. Until not
too long ago, many exclusions of religion were required by the Establishment Clause. 7 Over the past decade or so, however, the Supreme
Court's antiestablishment jurisprudence has shifted so that today
more forms of government support for religious practice are constitutionally permitted." That shift has increasingly presented federal and
state governments with the question of whether their support programs ought to include religious practices and institutions, not because of any legal requirement, but simply as a matter of policy. Some
have chosen not to extend such support to religious actors on equal
terms. 9 Consequently, a distinct legal question has become newly
prominent: now that governments are permitted to include sectarian
groups in certain support programs, are they constitutionally required
to do so?
In Excluding Religion, I argued that governments ought to be given
wider constitutional latitude to exclude religion from their support
programs than has conventionally been supposed,
although I also
I0
recommended certain limits on the practice.
I defended that more
permissive approach toward selective support solely as a matter of
constitutional law, leaving to one side the question of whether particular exclusions were desirable as a matter of good governance. My
proposition was simply that the Constitution has less to say about governmental decision making around the funding of religion than many

5

2005).

Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir.

Pelphreyv. Cobb County, Ga., 547 F.3d 1263, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2008).
See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971) (upholding an act
because it was "carefully drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be
devoted to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient institutions").
8 See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 210-11 (2005) (describing a series
of major
decisions in the 1990s and 2000s that relaxed restrictions on government funding of
religion).
9 See, e.g., Eulitt ex iel. Eulitt v. Me., Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d
344 (1st Cir. 2004)
(upholding the Maine voucher program, which funded only students that wished to
attend nonsectarian public or private school).
10 Nelson Tebbe, LxcludingReligion, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1263 (2008).
6
7
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have thought. Chiefly, that is so because religious freedom is best
viewed primarily, though not exclusively, as a guarantee of liberty or
autonomy, rather than neutrality or equality. According to that understanding, government often can decide not to subsidize the exercise of a protected activity without offending the Constitution. A key
distinction exists, then, between government regulation of religious
practice and government subsidy of it. Finally, I outlined five limits that
the Constitution imposes on the ability of governments to exclude religion.
Now three prominent scholars have offered thoughtful responses
to Excluding Religion." Unsurprisingly, they have endorsed certain of
its arguments while questioning others. In the first Part of this Response, I accept the invitation to explore the implications of my position for legal and political theory, albeit in a limited way. Then I defend some of my original points. Part II supports the affirmative
argument for wider governmental latitude to selectively deny support
to religion, and Part III discusses my proposed limits on that practice,
particularly the prohibition on singling out particular denominations
or sects.
I.
What would a permissive approach to excluding religion mean for
liberal or constitutional democracy? Without adopting a "muscular"
form of liberalism, as Richard Garnett invites me to do,2 I will test one
thought about the argument's possible implications for political theory.
Of course, a permissive approach to selective support need not
have any significance at all for ideal theory. A rule allowing some selective funding of religion could be compatible with a range of approaches to basic conceptual questions. That is because arguments
for the constitutionality of excluding religion occupy a middle level of
abstraction, at the highest-they draw on ordinary precedent and legal doctrine, as well as on a conception of the right to religious freedom, but not necessarily on arguments of basic design. Rather, they
take fundamental legal and political institutions largely as they find
11 Thomas C. Berg, Response, Religious Choice and Exclusions o/ Religion, 157
U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 100 (2008), http://NNwv.pennumbia.coirnesponses/12-2008/
Berg.pdf; Richard W. Garnett, Response, "Excding Religion ": A Response, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 113 (2008), http://wiww.pennunbia.com/r-esponses/12-2008/
Garnett.pdf; Steven D. Smith, Response, Playing Aound with Religion's Conslilulional
joints, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 123 (2008), http://Nww.pennunbia.com/
responses/ 12-2008/Smith.pdf.
12 See Garnett, suflra note 11, at 121.
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them, shaped as they are by the range of contingent circumstances
that characterize our actually existing, second-best world. Lower-level
arguments like those do not entail any necessary commitment to any
particular view of liberalism (though of course they are incompatible
with some such theories).
Nevertheless, people who oppose a neutralist conception of liberal democracy may also wish to allow government to be selective in its
support. Here, in other words, I hypothesize only that people who
think that democracies ought to be able to take positions on comprehensive conceptions of the good, rather than remaining neutral as to
such questions, may also wish to allow officials greater leeway to decide whether to subsidize religious observance. That combination of
views may strike some as counterintuitive, because people who defend
government's power to promote values that it considers worthwhile or
wholesome-often those who value religious commitments as a personal matter-tend to be the same ones who oppose exclusions of religion. Yet I think such people could well come out in favor of the
prescription that Excluding Religion defends. Although any particular
exclusion might not appeal to nonneutralists on policy grounds, allowing democratic branches constitutional authority to decide such
questions might be compatible with their view of government's role,
namely that the state ought to be able to encourage behavior that it
considers to be morally worthwhile.
Let us step back and unpack that hypothesis. One commonplace
understanding of liberalism holds, in part, that a democratic government ought to remain neutral as between private conceptions of the
good. 3 According to this view, a democracy best responds to modern
conditions of conflict among private values by striving to remain
evenhanded, neither promoting nor disfavoring one or another of the
comprehensive commitments that vie for citizens' allegiance." Re1'l
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191-92 (1985) (arguing
that
liberal "government must be neutral on what might be called the question of the good
life"); STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 177-78 (1999) (depicting liberalism as "a forn of government where political decisions are, in so far as possible, 'independent of any particular conception of the good life or what gives value to life"'
(quoting DWORKIN, supa note 13, at 191)); Michael J. Sandel, Freedom J'(nn.science or
Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE 74, 75 gaines Davison
Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990) ("[Liberalism's] central idea is that government
should be neutral on the question of the good life."); id.at 78-82 (arguing that this
philosophical version of liberalism inforins actual Supreme Court case law on religious
fi-eedorn).
14See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 191 ("Since the citizens of a society differ in their
conceptions [of the good life], the government does not treat them as equals if it pre-
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garding religion specifically, adherents of this conception have advocated strict separation of church and state as well as government neutrality among religions and between religion and irreligion.'
The
idea is that because government can never resolve ultimate disputes
over religion on terms that all citizens will find acceptable, a deimocracy ought to stay out of metaphysical debates, privileging none.
Opponents of this conception of liberal democracy have argued
that governmental neutrality regarding comprehensive commitments
is unnecessary, impossible, and/or undesirable." According to at least
some of them, government invariably does take positions on ultimate
questions, promoting positions on controversial moral issues with inplications for commitments of conscience. Moreover, that practice is
entirely proper and compatible with modern democracy. On this
view, what liberalism requires is only that the state not restrict individual freedom, not that it strive to cultivate a needless and unattainable
neutrality.
Think, for instance, of Justice Scalia, who has argued that it ought
to be perfectly permissible for government to endorse the idea of a
single divine creator in its pronouncements and displays." According
to him, American legal and political traditions have long countenanced government promotion not only of belief generally over nonbelief,8 but also its endorsement of one particular sort of religious
commitment-namely, monotheism or the belief in a single creator.'9
More generally, Justice Scalia has said that American constitutional
law ought to allow lawmakers to enact legislation that prohibits certain
activities solely on moral grounds. In support of government nonneutrality on questions of morality, he invokes longstanding bans on po21)
lygamy, incest, and prostitution.

fers one conception to another....").
15 Sandel,
for instance, argues that "religion offers the paradigmatic case for
bracketing controversial conceptions of the good." Sandel, supra note 13, at 78.
16 For theorists whose views approximate this position, see generally JOSEPH
RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) and JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Edward
Alexander ed., Broadview Press 1999) (1859).
17 See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844,
894 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Historical practices thus demonstrate that there is a distance between the
acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment of a religion.").
Is See id. at 885-89.
19 See id. at 894.
20 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking
with approval "[s]tate laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, piostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity," and describing
these as "laws based on moral choices").
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Now, of course, Justice Scalia may simply be opposed to liberalism.
But it is not necessary to go that far to think that government ought to
be able to take positions on matters of morality and conscience, and
that the core attributes of liberal democracy lie not in government
neutrality, but instead in popular sovereignty combined with robust
equal protection of individual liberty or autonomy. Other serious
thinkers have advocated similar conceptions.'
My point is just that people who take the view that a liberal government ought to be able to promote conduct that it thinks is valuable, so long as it does not restrict the freedom to dissent, may also
take the view that government has discretion to engage in a certain
amount of selective subsidization. With regard to religion, someone
like Justice Scalia who believes government can endorse religion as a
category, or even monotheism in particular, may also want to allow
government discretion to single out religion for nonsupport. While
such a person may not approve of any particular exclusion of religion
on policy grounds, lie would support the broader sense that government ought to be allowed, as matter of legal and political theory, to
take moral positions regarding citizen conduct. Under this combination of views, both promoting and declining to promote religious
practice would be permissible, at least within certain limits discussed
below.
So while a more permissive approach to excluding religion might
seem at first to appeal chiefly to separationists, who see such a rule as
a poor substitute for a constitutional prohibition on subsidies of religion, Excluding Religion may also hold some appeal for people who favor
greater governmental influence over matters of conscience and morality. Put differently, the article's argument is at least compatible with a
conception of democracy that envisions government taking somewhat
greater care to guide its citizens in matters of conscience than neutralist conceptions have been willing to contemplate. To be clear, I am
not endorsing that political theory or any other here. Instead, I am
suggesting only that Excluding Religion may prove attractive to a group
of theorists who might at first seem particularly inclined against it.
II.
The principal argument of Excluding Religion is that government
ought to have greater constitutional leeway than is commonly sup-

21 See sources cited supra note 16.
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posed to decline to support religious actors or entities.22 That is
chiefly because religious freedom is best conceptualized as a right to
liberty or autonomy that is not normally burdened when government
decides simply to forego subsidizing its exercise. The article therefore
draws an important distinction between government regulation, on
the one hand, and government support, on the other. With regard to
the former, the First Amendment places real limits on the ability of
law and policy to regulate observance, because there the threat of
hindrance is very real.2 With respect to the latter, however, religious
practitioners will often not be thwarted by an official decision to withhold state support. The article illustrates that point by gesturing toward other liberty-based rights, such as free speech and due process,
as to which the Court has held that government may selectively deny
aid, even when it targets constitutionally protected activity. The Court
itself has even compared religious freedom to free speech and due
process in just this way, saying that lawmakers may decide to subsidize
one protected activity rather than another. 4 And again, the article
differentiates between its constitutional argument and any suggestion-which it avoids-that excluding religion is attractive or necessary as a matter of ordinary policy.
In his perceptive response, Steven Smith calls this a "play in the
joints" approach . It is easy to see why he thinks that phrase fits, because the article does share something with approaches that argue for
greater room for government maneuvering between the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses. I avoid that formulation for a reason,
though: it risks eliding the critical distinction between regulation and
funding. While I do think that government should have somewhat
greater latitude over funding decisions in certain carefully-defined areas, I have also argued that it should face greaterconstitutional limits on
its ability to regulate conduct than exists under current law. So overall, my position, when filly worked out, differs from what the phrase
"play in the joints" might call to mind. And that position makes sense

22

2J,

Tebbe, supra note 10, at 1267.
See id.at 1280 (discussing the distinction made by the Court in Locke v. Davey,

540 U.S. 712 (2004), between regulation and funding).
24 See id. at 1283-84 (explaining the Davy Court's implicit but unmistakable references to free speech and due process cases).
Smith, supra note 11, at 123.
S5
26 See Nelson Tebbe, Free Fxeirise and the Prblem ( Symmeto, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699,
703-05 (2005) (arguing for a more robust Free Exercise doctrine guided by "liberty
and forinal neutrality").
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if you believe-as Smith himself seems to 2 7 -- that the primary value of
free exercise is liberty or autonomy, because government regulation
risks coercion in ways that defunding often does not.
Conceptualizing religious freedom as a liberty right ought to be
enough to support my prescription, but it leaves open the question of
why officials would want to withhold aid to religion as a matter of policy. Are there any good reasons to do so, apart from simple bias or
animus? I suggest that colorable policy rationales do exist, and I offer
three possibilities: to avoid dissensus and promote unity among the
citizenry, to lift the requirement that taxpayers support religious practices with which they disagree as a matter of conscience, and to protect equal citizenship. Each of these justifications has the added virtue
of resonating with antiestablishment norms that are grounded, to one
degree or another, in the American constitutional tradition. Now,
these reasons may not be particularly strong as a constitutional matter. 8 Yet the point is not that they justify a constitutional rule requiring the exclusion of religion, or even that they are persuasive on the
level of policy, but simply that they provide decent, nonarbitrary
grounds for policymakers to opt not to subsidize religious observance
on the same terms as other social practices. These three rationales
need to do little work for the argument to succeed-they need only
provide grounds other than mere bias to exclude religion. Garnett
acknowledges that they offer "good reasons for legislating. 2' Nothing
more is required. And to the degree that the responses argue that any
one of these rationales does not resonate, even faintly, with the
American antiestablishment tradition, I respectfully disagree.
Thomas Berg argues that if the First Amendment means that government must minimize its influence over private religious choices,
then excluding religion should not be permitted. Obviously this is
so. After all, declining to subsidize religious practice, even while
choosing to aid other practices, will discourage observance. So Berg
spends the bulk of his response demonstrating that the no-influence
approach best fits constitutional history, structure, and precedent.
That theory has been developed and defended at greater length by
27 See Smith, .supna note 11, at 127-28 (agreeing that "freedom of religion is best

conceptualized as a right to liberty or autonomy").
28 See Garnett, supra note 11, at 117-18 (recognizing that there may be sound legislative reasons for refusing to fund religious activity, but questioning whether they qualifyas constitutional reasons).
29 Id. at 117 (internal quotation narks omitted).
See Berg, supra note 11, at 101.
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Berg and other leading scholars)' While I am sympathetic to their
work and believe that it captures much of the American constitutional
approach to religious freedom, I have argued that it sits somewhat uncomfortably with these authors' own commitment to the value of religious exemptions (a commitment that I share) .3
Moreover, the no-influence approach pulls against important aspects of the Court's case law. Most obviously, the Court squarely rejected that reading in its most significant free exercise decision to
date, Employment Division v. Smith.3 Although Smith has drawn criticism, the case stands in the way of the argument from precedent. And
while Smith concerned a regulation, the Court's decisions with respect
to funding also sometimes clash with the no-influence approach."
There are also significant conflicts between the theory and cases concerning government displays of religious symbols, such as the decision
upholding legislative prayer-a patently nonneutral practice.
Certainly, the case law also contains many passages deploring discrimination among religion or against religion as a whole, but there is a serious question whether such statements apply to selective funding.
After all, they did not seem to trouble the Court too much when it
upheld an exclusion of religion in Locke v. Davey.!'
So while the no-influence theory has offered arguments from
precedent that are respectable (and widely respected), they do not
seem to me to be dispositive. Nor do its arguments from history, but I

A

See Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The Mislakes in Locke v. Davey
and the
Future qf Slate Paymenlsfin Services Piovided b)yReligious Institulions, 40 TULSA L. REV. 227,
232-33 (2004) (describing and defending substantive neutrality); Douglas Laycock, or
real, Substav tive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993,
1018 (1990) (arguing that neutrality is the closest the author can come "to a single
principle that summarizes the religion clauses"); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Appnach to iRsues ]'Retigiu.s Fineedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989)
(proposing "an economic definition of 'neutrality' to determine when government action impinges impermissibly on religious choice").
.2 Tebbe, .supianote 26, at 714-23.
494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) ("[I] f prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the
object of [a law] but inerely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.").
.4 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (holding
that Washington could
constitutionally exclude students of devotional theology from its scholarship program).
Also, the direct aid case, MVitchell v. Helms, arguably sets out an approach that would
allow the government to fund only secular schools. 530 U.S. 793, 869 (2000).
M See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95
(1983). The Court will almost certainly also uphold the Pledge of Allegiance, despite its inclusion of the phrase "under
God." See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (resolving the
case on standing grounds).
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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will leave those to one side. Ultimately, Kent Greenawalt probably put
it best when he recently wrote that although the no-influence approach
captures much of the meaning of the religion clauses, it alone does
not always or filly describe everything that they permit or require .
Neutrality articulates some of what the Constitution signifies regarding religion, but a freestanding liberty or autonomy component is a
necessary-and prominent-element of any satisfying understanding.
I take comfort from knowing that Smith seems to accept both my
argument that religious freedom should be interpreted primarily (or,
for him, perhaps completely) as a right to liberty or autonomy, and
my contention that thinking of it that way suggests the general permissibility of exclusions of religion.38 Garnett also seems to think that
the practice of excluding religion ought to be free of constitutional
constraints, for the most part. 9 And while Berg has not been convinced, that is because of the genuine conceptual difference that I
have just described regarding the proper reading of the religion
411
clauses. Once the smoke has cleared, therefore, the principal argument of ExcludingReligion appears to have stood up well.
III.
Although liberty or autonomy is the principal value driving the
argument of Excluding Religion, it is not the only one. Consequently, I
offer several limits on officials' ability to exclude religion, most of
which sound in neutrality or evenhandedness. These restrictions
seem to me undeniable, not only because each of them occupies an
important place in our legal tradition, but also for independent reasons of constitutional theory.
On account of these limits, Smith concludes that I do not actually
believe in an autonomy approach." Yet he himself does not offer a
.7

See 2

KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:

AND FAIRNESS

ESTABLISHMENT

456 & n.14 (2008) (quoting Douglas Laycock as saying, "I have never

claimed or intended that substantive neutrality should be the single explanation or
only value of the Religion Clauses").
See Smith, supra note 11, at 127-28 ("I am more attracted to Tebbe's view than
Tebbe himself is .... ); see also id. at 131 (suggesting simply a rule against coercion).
3 See Garnett, supra note 11, at 117 (accepting that "governments may and should,
sometimes and for some purposes, treat religion in a special or distinctive way").
10See Berg, supra note 11, at 101 ("[T]he Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
together require government to minimize the effect it has on the choices of private
individuals and groups in matters of religion.").
41 See Smith, surna note 11, at 131 (saying that despite the similarity between
a
noncoercion approach and my liberty approach, I seem "not at all attracted" to either,
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unitary principle or value that he thinks can accurately capture everything that religious freedom should permit or require. And for good
reason: matters are more complicated than that. Sometimes his writing gives the impression that the entire endeavor of trying to identify
constitutional principles in this area is hopeless.42 But to me, saying
that the interpretive undertaking is complex is not the same as saying
that it is meaningless or impossible.' With regard to exclusions of religion, it does not follow from my contention that certain freestanding
neutrality protections are necessary that noncoercion is not the primary value in the right to free exercise, nor does it follow that the
right has no comprehensible structure at all.44
Take, for instance, my first proposed limit, which prohibits exclusions that discriminate on the basis of sect or denomination. None of
the responses ultimately contends that there should not be a strict
constitutional rule against government preferentialism of this sort.
(Nor does any of them deny, in the final analysis, the attractiveness of
any of the other limits I propose, as far as I can tell.) Yet today scholars are becoming interested in whether and why government should
be prohibited from singling out particular faiths for favor or disfavor,
and the responses reflect that curiosity. So Smith objects that it is not
enough to say that the rule against government preferentialism is
longstanding in our constitutional tradition, as it undeniably is, because neutrality toward religion is similarly ancient, and yet I seem
happy to devalue that principle.' And Garnett wonders why a liberal
democracy cannot disfavor certain faiths. After all, he reasonably
points out, some of them are more compatible with American democ-

because I retain certain limits grounded in neutrality).
42 See id.at 125 ("[T]here just is not much to say-no sufficiently
definite standards or authorities to appeal to-that could or should convince anybody who is not
independently inclined toward a particular advocate's point of view."); see alo 2
GREENAWALT, suflra note 37, at 438-39 (noting Smith's "skepticism").
43 See Nelson Tebbe, Edec iism, 25 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2009) (book
review) (manuscript at 1), available at http://ssin.com/abstiact-1333767 (noting the
meaningful distinction between concluding that interpreting the religion clauses is
impossible and "irreducibly intricate").
44 There is an interesting disagreement among the responses
regarding whether
the limits I propose are narrow or broad. Smith thinks they are broad, and will ensure
a place in this area for robustjudicial intervention. Smith, supra note 11, at 132. Berg,
however, thinks they are narrow, not powerful enough to guarantee the sort of neutralitythat he thinks the religion clauses require. Berg, supra note 11, at 104-05.
45 See Smith, supra note 11, at 132 (asserting that, in fact,
"nonpreferentialism
seems to be a corollary of th[e] more general requirement of neutrality, which itself
has been long considered a basic feature of American jurisprudence" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

294

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
PENNumbra

[Vol. 157: 283

racy than others, and one might expect government to be able to craft
its subsidy programs accordingly.
First, I do not think it is true that neutrality as between religion
and nonreligion is as firmly rooted in precedent as the ban oil preferentialism. While there are plenty of passages in Supreme Court dicta
endorsing neutrality among religions and between religion and irreligion," the actual holdings are less consistent, as I show in the article.
In fact, it is difficult to think of a single free exercise or antiestablishment decision striking down an exclusion of religion as a whole from
an aid program.48 With regard to differentiation among sects, however, the Court has been almost entirely consistent.
Second, rule of law considerations bolster the commonsensical
conclusion that a constitutional democracy ought not draw lines between or among religious groups. In the democratic tradition, there
is a fundamental prohibition on government action that is arbitrary or
irrational. One way of formulating this ban is that government cannot take action based on reasons that are accessible only to people
who share a certain comprehensive commitment and not to outsiders,
who will view those reasons as senseless or meaningless. Imagine, for
instance, that a state establishes a voucher program under which parents can choose to direct government funds to all public and private
schools except to, say, Lutheran ones. There could be no nonarbitrary, accessible reason for officials to craft that sort of exclusion-no
legitimate ground to think that Lutheran schools should be treated
differently from any others on account of their Lutheran character.
What could possibly lead a government to engage in that sort of targeting? The action could be based on unthinking bias, which is, of
course, anathema in our constitutional system, or it could be an ex" See Garnett, supia note 11, at 120-21 ("It would seem noncontroversial
that some
faiths are more simpatico with political liberalism than others, so why should the state
not be able to subsidize accordingly?"); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-O)JApproach to
feligio'us Doctrine: What Am' We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 837, 860-61
(2009) (discussing my proposed limit on preferential exclusions of religion).
47 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("[The
First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and non-believers .... ").
48 Of course, there are fiee speech decisions that do something like
that, but the
neutrality language that Smith quotes comes firom religious fireedom cases, not speech
cases.
1,9See Nelson Tebbe, Wilclicnli and Slaleciqla: Liberal Demociat) in Afiica,
96 GEO.
L.J. 183, 226-27 (2007) (illustrating how bans on capricious governmental action promote fieedom, equality, and other liberal ideals).
50 See id.
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pression of an official theological commitment that is unavailable to
those who do not share it-such as the excluded Lutherans, perhaps,
or people who do not speak the language of Christian theology at all.
Whatever its exact formulation, the rule of law presents an obstacle to
official policy when it is based oil what will seem to many citizens to be
nothing more than capriciousness.)
None of that is to say that officials cannot disfavor undemocratic
practices free of this concern, as Garnett rightly suggests that they
can. That is true regardless of whether the disfavored conduct tends
to be engaged in by certain sects more than others, or even exclusively
by some. So for instance, it would not constitute preferentialism for a
government to prohibit aid to organizations that conduct terrorist activities against the United States, even if calls to violence tended to be
limited to certain faiths.5, There is a crucial difference between, on
the one hand, singling out a denomination for definding out of siiple bias or for theological reasons and, on the other hand, declining
to support all organizations that engage in condemned practices.
What matters is that the ground for condemnation is accessible to all
citizens, even if they object.
Excluding on the basis of religion as a category is not capricious in
that way. There are understandable reasons for a government to decide not to subsidize observance as a whole. Where that is not the
case, and the exclusion really is based on bias or animus, another of
my limits kicks in. But when differentiation among sects is at issue, a
general ban is appropriate. So both as a matter of political tradition
and constitutional theory, nonpreferentialism has a place in our democracy that is difficult to question. Doubtless, others will differ with
me on the best way tojustify it, but the rule itself appears to be uncontroverted. To my mind, the other limits on government discretion in
this area are similarly unavoidable, although surely there is also a great
deal of worthwhile thinking to be done regarding their rationales.

51 For a harder hypothetical, imagine a government
program that provided financial support to small, impecunious denominations, citing an interest in fostering religious plualism and counteracting the overwhelning influence of majority faiths.
Would such a policy constitute impermissible preferentialism or permissible pursuit of
a neutral policy? I am grateful to Susan Herman for raising this question.
52 See Garnett, suirpi note 11, at 120-21. Of course such programs can raise diffi-

cult constitutional questions when they pit religious freedom against, say, gender
equality or other values of constitutional stature. Yet those difficulties must be worked
out independent of the problem of preferentialism.
5.1 John Finnis, Discrimitiation Between Rehgniorts: Some IThoughts
oin Rea,/dig Greenawait's Religion and the Constitution:
MENT. (forthcoming 2009).

Establishment and Fairness, 25 CONST. COM-

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
PENNumbra

296

[Vol. 157: 283

CONCLUSION

Why do people engage in scholarship of this sort, asks Smith?5'
He kindly calls Excluding Religion "impressive," but lie also wonders
what motivates its inquiry. It is interesting to consider what drives a
question like that. My sense, which could be wrong, is that the question presents itself to him precisely because he thinks that it is virtually
impossible to generate determinate answers in this area of law on account of his assessment that the considerations-text, structure, and
history-stand in equipoise, or at least allow plenty of room for reasonable minds to differ. Because of that situation, scholars cannot
generate arguments that will convince people who are not already inclined to agree with them. And if that is your view, you may well wonder why scholars bother.
But that is not my view. Rather, I see a collective effort to detect,
describe, and defend the values that underlie the American constitutional order. That effort is difficult because political life is exceedingly intricate, and because circumstances are ceaselessly changing.
So someone puts forward a view of the Constitution regarding exclusions of religion, and others disagree, and over time we work out a
modus vivendi-or perhaps even an agreement in principle. While it
may not be possible to convince people who are already committed to
another view, it may well happen that people at the margins will not
have made up their minds and can be swayed. Moreover, the alternative is unclear. Judges, policymakers, and other constitutional actors
will make decisions concerning exclusions of religion regardless of
what we do in the academy. Is the better course to remain silent or is
it to do what we can to make the best arguments available to them?
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